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Abstract—In this paper, we address the problem of
FingerCode-based identity matching using encrypted templates.
Instead of the classical approach of combining secure signal
processing (SSP) tools to mimic the behavior of some well-
known identity matching algorithm, we will investigate the
possibility of using a SSP-friendly biometric implementation, i.e.,
an implementation based on SSP tools. We will propose two
alternative strategies for reducing the size of the FingerCode
templates, to make them compatible with existing SSP solutions.
Experimental results show that feature size reduction has a
very limited impact on the accuracy of the biometric system,
demonstrating that encrypted domain identity matching can be
implemented without sacriﬁcing biometric performance.
Index Terms—Biometric-Based Identiﬁcation, Fingercode, Se-
cure Signal Processing, Signal Processing in the Encrypted
Domain
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometric data, such as ﬁngerprints, irises, face images, are
increasingly viewed as one of the most powerful form of iden-
tiﬁcation in security applications. The reason for this success
is that biometric traits are universal, unique and irreplaceable:
every person has biometric traits, which are usually unique
for each individual, and many of the physical features of the
owner are assumed to remain constant or change little during
the years. If this is a very desirable property in identifying
people, on the other hand this also makes biometric traits
invaluable to the owners. Their protection from unauthorized
use is therefore critical to prevent identity theft and ensure
public acceptance of the techniques that are based on them.
Secure signal processing (SSP), also referred to as signal
processing in the encrypted domain, is a ﬁeld of research
that has gained considerable interest in recent years [1]. SSP
techniques aim at processing signals in a secure or privacy-
preserving manner: the paradigm is that the entity in charge
of processing a signal should be able to do it without gath-
ering any information about the signal itself. Therefore, SSP
techniques seem particularly suited to biometric applications,
since they will allow us to perform biometric matching without
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disclosing any information regarding the involved biometric
traits.
Although SSP techniques have been already applied to
speciﬁc biometric problems (e.g., face recognition [2], [3]),
there are still several limitations to their use in a broader
set of biometric applications. On one hand, to achieve the
best matching performance we must use speciﬁc algorithms
for each different biometric trait. On the other hand, such
algorithms usually require complex processing tasks that are
difﬁcult to implement via SSP. An example is ﬁngerprint
matching: in this case the best performance is obtained by
minutiae-based algorithms; however, such algorithms require
the solution of a point pattern matching problem, for which
we have no efﬁcient protocols in the encrypted domain.
In the ﬁeld of SSP, very efﬁcient solutions can be found
when the matching problem can be modeled as a distance
computation followed by a comparison with a threshold.
Distances between encrypted vectors or between an encrypted
vector and a plaintext one can be easily implemented by
relying on homomorphic cryptosystems [4]–[6], whereas the
“greater than” problem can be efﬁciently solved either by
speciﬁc protocols exploiting the homomorphic properties [2],
[7] or by using garbled circuits [3], [8]. Hence, a reasonable
approach could be that of looking for biometric matching
algorithms that can be implemented relying only on these
simple bulding blocks.
For what concerns ﬁngerprint matching, a natural can-
didate is the FingerCode-based approach [9]. FingerCodes
are templates obtained by applying a bank of Gabor ﬁlters
to a ﬁngerprint image and computing the average absolute
deviation of the result over a set of concentric radial sectors.
Since the resulting templates are ﬁxed size vectors, identity
comparison is simply performed by comparing the Euclidean
distance between FingerCodes with a threshold.
In this paper, we will address the problem of implement-
ing a Fingercode-based matching algorithm in the encrypted
domain. Our approach will not be that of investigating new
cryptographic protocols, rather we will study how to adapt the
original FingerCode algorithm so that it can be implemented
relying on existing and efﬁcient protocols. We will see that
this adaptation requires some simpliﬁcation of both the Finger-
Code algorithm and the FingerCode representation. Particular
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Fig. 1. Scheme of the biometric recognition method based on the template
Fingercode.
attention will be devoted to the possibility of reducing the
size of the FingerCode and the number of bits used for
representing each FingerCode component without affecting
the overall performance of the system. An interesting result
is that FingerCode matching is still possible using templates
with very few bits, which greatly reduces the complexity of
an encrypted domain implementation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
FingerCode-based identity comparison is brieﬂy reviewed,
while in Section III the proposed modeling of FingerCode
distances is introduced, together with appropriate strategies for
the reduction of the size of FingerCode features. The effects
of feature size reduction are investigated through experimental
results in Section IV. Finally, concluding remarks are given in
Section V.
II. FINGERCODE-BASED IDENTIFICATION
The computation of the biometric template in the plain
domain is based on a FingerCode method. This method
encompasses four main steps:
1) determine a reference point;
2) tessellate the region of interest (ROI) around the refer-
ence point;
3) ﬁlter the region of interest in eight different directions
using a bank of Gabor ﬁlters;
4) compute the average absolute deviation from the mean
of gray values in individual sectors in ﬁltered images to
deﬁne the feature vector or the Fingercode.
The obtained feature vector is composed by a numerical vector
of double precision elements. For example, in [9], the size of
this vector ranges from 640 to 896 elements, according to the
used ﬁngerprint dataset. Since the FingerCode method is not
rotational invariant, during the enroll phase, 9 templates related
to different rotations of the original image are computed.
The match-score of two templates consists in the minimum
Euclidean distance between the 9 enrolled templates and the
live template (computed from the ﬁngerprint image captured
during the biometric recognition phase). Fig. 1 shows the
schema of the method proposed in [9] and the input/output
data of the described steps.
Experiments shown that the critical task of this method
is the estimation of the reference point. This point must be
unique for each image related to the same ﬁnger. An incorrect
estimation of this point implies a different ROI evaluation,
causing an increasing of the identiﬁcation errors. We proposed
different methods to reduce this problem (a discussion related
to this argument is presented in [10]).
As shown in Table I, the principal parameters that we
considered for the reduction of the number of features of the
ﬁnal template are:
• the number of Gabor ﬁlters applied to the image (N.
Filters);
• the number of rings used for the tessellation of the ROI
(N. Rings);
• the height expressed in pixel of the rings (H. Rings);
• the number of arcs used for the tessellation of the ROI
(N. Arcs).
III. FINGERCODE DISTANCE MODELING
To model the squared distances of genuines and impostors
we rely on a simpliﬁed model based on the following observa-
tion: we can see the measured FingerCode as the composition
of an “ideal” component and a noisy component, so that every
genuine instance will share the ideal part (as they come from
the same ﬁnger), while the error will change (as it depends on
the image acquisition context). Let x˜ be the ideal component
and e be the error component. The measured FingerCode x
can therefore be expressed as:
x = x˜+ e
For the sake of simplicity, momentarily we consider the
distances taken without the minimum selection as they were
computed between the FingerCode to be authenticated and an
enrollment set made of a single FingerCode. The distance D0
between genuines will have the form:
D0 =
∑
i
(e1 (i)− e2 (i))
2
while the distance D1 computed between impostors will
have the form:
D1 =
∑
i
(x˜1 (i)− x˜2 (i) + e1 (i)− e2 (i))
2
Under the hypothesis that measurement errors are zero-mean
i.i.d. Gaussian variables e ∼ N
(
0, σ2e
)
, FingerCodes are i.i.d.
Gaussian variables (μx  σx), and x and e are mutually
independent, we can see that both D0 and D1 are Chi-Square
distributed, as follows:
D0 ∼ 2σ
2
eχ
2
ν
D1 ∼ 2
(
σ2e + σ
2
x
)
χ2ν
where χ2ν is a standard Chi-Square variable with ν degrees of
freedom, mean ν and variance 2ν.
In Fig. 2 is shown the outcome of the Chi-Square ﬁtting
test with the actual distances between genuines and impostors:
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Fig. 2. Distribution and Chi-Square ﬁtting of the distances between Finger-
Codes, using a single template per enrollment: (a) genuines; (b) impostors.
such distances are computed over the data set described in
Section IV, using FingerCode vectors of 640 features. As to
D0, the ﬁtting with a Chi-Square distribution is quite poor,
probably due to the fact that measurement errors on the
same ﬁnger are correlated and exhibit non-Gaussian statistics.
On the other hand, D1 is well modeled by a Chi-Square
distribution. Interestingly, the values of the degrees of freedom
of the Chi-Square functions (ν) are far under the number
of FingerCode features. This fact suggests that the length
of FingerCode vectors can be considerably reduced to make
it suitable for encrypted domain computing, without losing
FingerCode discriminating properties.
A simple strategy to exploit the correlation of FingerCode
features could be to decimate the FingerCode representation.
A possible approach is to reduce the number of sectors of the
tessellation to yield shorter vectors. Even if this strategy does
not guarantee to extract truly independent features, it has the
advantage of being applicable to every dataset.
An alternative approach is that of looking for the most com-
pact representation. Taking into account the reduced number
of degrees of freedom, we can model a FingerCode vector as
follows
x = As (1)
where s is a M×1 vector of i.i.d. Gaussian variables and A is
a N×M projection matrix such that ATA = IM , with M 
N , N being the length of FingerCode vector x. Considering
the difference of mutually independent FingerCodes, this will
be given as
x1 − x2 = A(s1 − s2) = Ad (2)
i.e., the squared distance between mutually independent Fin-
gerCodes is D1 = (x1−x2)T (x1−x2) = dTATAd = dTd,
which is distributed as a Chi-Square with ν = M degrees of
freedom.
From the above model, it is evident that a set of reduced
FingerCodes obtained as s = ATx will retain the same
discriminating capabilities as the original FingerCodes. If we
concentrate on a speciﬁc dataset, the projection matrix A can
be obtained via principal component analysis (PCA). First of
all, we estimate the covariance matrix from the data set, i.e.,
Cx =
1
L
∑
j
xjx
T
j − xx
T (3)
where L is the size of the dataset and x = 1
L
∑
j xj . Then,
we compute the eigendecomposition of the covariance matrix
as Cx = VΣV
T
. If the data exactly follow the model in
(1), then only the ﬁrst M eigenvalues in Σ will be different
from zero. In practice this will not be always true, however
the projection matrix can be computed as the M eigenvectors
corresponding to the M eigenvalues having higher magnitude.
Now it is possible to approach the real model, introducing
the minimum distance selection. We remind that we use an
enrollment set composed by nine different FingerCodes, each
corresponding to the ﬁngerprint image rotated by an angle
between −45 and 45 degrees.
It is possible to obtain the distribution fn (x) of the dis-
tances taken as the minimum of a set of n elements from the
distribution f (x) of the 1:1 distances, under the hypothesis
that the n observations are independent, with the following
relation:
fn (x) = nf (x) [1− F (x)]
n−1
where F (x) is the cumulative distribution function of the 1:1
distances.
In Fig. 3 is shown the outcome of the test. We can see
that the ﬁtting quality is very poor, probably because the nine
distances between the FingerCode to be authenticated and the
FingerCodes of the enrollment set are not independent at all. In
fact, the FingerCodes that compose the enrolled template of an
individual represent the same image rotated. For this reason, it
is plausible that functions of the Euclidean distances between
these data are dependent.
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Fig. 3. Distribution and Chi-Square ﬁtting of the distances between
FingerCodes, using nine templates per enrollment: (a) genuines; (b) impostors.
A. Quantization Effects
Since our aim is to simplify the FingerCode representation
to make it suitable for encrypted domain computations, we try
to introduce the quantization of the feature values in the model.
Let x be a FingerCode and let ρ (·) be a quantization function.
The quantized FingerCode is denoted by xq = ρ (x) and x =
xq + q, where q is the quantization error introduced by the
quantization process. According to the previous representation,
a FingerCode is made by an ideal component, an acquisition
noise component, and a quantization noise component: xq =
x˜+e+q. We can compute the distances D0 between genuines
and ﬁnd
D0 =
N∑
i=1
(x˜1 (i) + e1 (i) + q1 (i)− (x˜2 (i) + e2 (i) + q2 (i)))
2
that can be expressed in short as follows:
D0 =
N∑
i=1
(Δe (i) + Δq (i))
2
where N is the number of elements in a FingerCode,
and Δe (i) , Δq (i) are the differences between acquisition
errors and quantization errors, respectively. Unluckily, the
quantization errors e and the FingerCode x are not independent
and the model becomes very complicated.
To overcome these problems, we decided to deal with
the data from an empirical point of view. We investigated
the reduction of the FingerCode features with two different
approaches. The ﬁrst approach is based on the decimation of
the tessellation of the region of interest and we will name it
tessellation reduction. The second approach is based on the
application of PCA to the chosen dataset. It is important to
notice that while the ﬁrst method can be applied to every
database, i.e., it is not data-dependent, the PCA approach im-
plies an eigenvalue recomputation for every different database.
The effect of quantization on the obtained datasets will be
then evaluated by investigating the statistical properties of
the distances, i.e., mean and standard deviation when the
FingerCode features are quantized using different number
of bits, and by analyzing the matching performance of the
quantized FingerCodes.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section it will be shown the behavior of data statistic
parameters depending on the number of quantization bits and
FingerCode features used. Finally we will focus upon Equal
Error Rate (EER) and receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curves to describe the performance achieved by FingerCode
matching with tessellation reduction and PCA.
Results are based on a database of 408 ﬁngerprint samples
captured by a Cross Match Veriﬁer 300 scanner at 500 dpi
[11]. There are 8 samples for each ﬁnger, resulting in a total
of 51 different ﬁngers. For each sample, we generate nine
FingerCode templates corresponding to a set of nine rotations
from −45◦ to 45◦ and we consider the template corresponding
to 0◦ as the reference FingerCode. The statistic of the distances
of genuines are evaluated by computing the distance between
each reference FingerCode and the templates of the other 7
acquisitions of the same ﬁnger, resulting in 7 ∗ 51 = 357
distance values. The statistic of the distances of impostors are
evaluated by computing the distance between each reference
FingerCode and the templates of the other 50 ﬁngers, resulting
in 8 ∗ 50 ∗ 51 = 20400 distance values.
When using tessellation reduction, we generate 8 sets of
FingerCodes with length ranging from 640 features to 8
features. The choice of FingerCode parameters for each set is
detailed in Table I. When using PCA, we consider reduced
representations with length ranging from 64 features to 4
features, obtained by applying PCA to the original FingerCode
set having length 640 features.
In Fig. 4-(a) it is shown the mean of the distances between
genuines using tessellation reduction: we can see that the mean
TABLE I
PARAMETERS OF FINGERCODES OBTAINED BY TESSELLATION
REDUCTION.
N. Features N.Filters N. Rings H. Rings (pixel) N. Arcs
640 8 5 20 16
384 8 4 25 12
192 8 3 20 8
96 4 3 33 8
48 4 3 33 4
32 4 2 50 4
16 4 2 50 2
8 2 2 50 2
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Fig. 4. Mean (a) and standard deviation (b) of the distances between genuines
when using tesselation reduction.
grows slightly with the number of features, while it starts
to increase with strong quantizations, especially using long
FingerCodes. The standard deviation parameter (Fig. 4-(b))
is less sensitive to the quantization strength, and it seems
to increase only depending on the number of features. The
trend of mean and standard deviation of the distances between
impostors is similar (Fig. 5). It is possible to explain the
behavior of the distances between impostors considering that
the contribution of quantization noise is not enough to change
the original statistic.
Now, we focus on the same parameters estimated on the
dataset treated with a PCA approach. The parameters behavior
is almost the same for genuines and impostors, and it shows
a very weak dependence on the number of features, while a
strong increase of the distances is observed with few quanti-
zation bits, especially for longer FingerCodes (Figs. 6-7). A
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Fig. 5. Mean (a) and standard deviation (b) of the distances between
impostors when using tesselation reduction.
reason for the weak dependence on the number of features is
that PCA approach allows the selection of the most distinctive
values of the FingerCode to represent the vector itself.
Now we pay attention to the biometric system performance.
The ROC curves are indexes of the system quality and they are
created plotting the False Non-Match Rate (FNMR) against the
False match Rate (FMR) as the discrimination threshold varies.
The more the system is accurate, the more the ROC curve is
close to the axis. Comparing the ROC curves for databases
with 640 (Fig. 8-(a)) and 96 features (Fig. 8-(b)) produced
with tessellation reduction we can see that the performances
are very similar, even using a strong quantization. To complete
the assessment of the system performance we look at the Equal
Error Rate (EER). Fig. 9-(a) shows the trend of the EER as
the number of bits and features varies. It is possible to set two
imaginary boundaries corresponding to a quantization of 2 bit
and a FingerCode length of 96 features, where the performance
is approximately unaffected by the FingerCode simpliﬁcation.
Fig. 8-(c) shows the ROC curves of a database made of Fin-
gerCodes 8 features long, computed via PCA. We can see that
the performance achieved is quite good up to a quantization
of 4 bits, while increasing the quantization strength it starts to
get worse quickly.
Finally, we focus on the EER trend. Fig. 9-(b) shows that
even in this case, it is possible to set two imaginary boundaries
for a quantization of 4 bits and a FingerCode length of 8
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Fig. 6. Mean (a) and standard deviation (b) of the distances between genuines
when using PCA.
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Fig. 7. Mean (a) and standard deviation (b) of the distances between
impostors when using PCA.
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Fig. 8. ROC curves of the FingeCode system using different quantization
steps: (a) 640 features (original conﬁguration); (b) 96 features with tesselation
reduction; (c) 8 features with PCA.
features to deﬁne a region where the EER remains acceptable.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
By looking at the results shown in the previous section,
it is evident that the size of FingerCode templates can be
signiﬁcantly reduced without affecting the performance of the
biometric system. To evaluate the effects of this reduction of
the template size on the complexity of an encrypted domain
implementation, we can refer to the data provided in [10],
which describes a complete implementation of the encrypted
domain FingerCode matching protocol based on homomorphic
encryption and garbled circuits. The computational time and
the bandwidth used by the SSP protocol proposed in [10]
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Fig. 9. Equal error rate (EER) achieved by the different feature reduction
strategies in the various conﬁgurations: (a) tesselation reduction; (b) PCA.
TABLE II
COMPUTATIONAL TIME OF THE SSP PROTOCOL IN [10] WITH A DATABASE
OF 100 ENROLLED ENTRIES (900 FEATURE VECTORS). SECURITY
PARAMETER: 80 BITS
Features Quantization Time (s)
96 2 37.43
96 4 45.58
192 2 44.43
192 4 53.66
640 8 114
are reported in Tables II and III, respectively, using different
FingerCode conﬁgurations. As we can see, a FingerCode
conﬁguration using 96 features obtained through tesselation
reduction and quantized with 2 bits employs approximately the
33% of the computational time and the 40% of the bandwidth
required by the original conﬁguration. Since the proposed
conﬁguration achieves a biometric performance very close to
that of the original conﬁguration, the proposed reduction of
the template size can considerably ease the implementation of
encrypted domain biometric matching.
A further complexity reduction can be expected using the
PCA strategy. However, in this case we can expect the optimal
projection matrix to be data dependent. Hence, an encrypted
domain implementation will require either to make this pro-
jection matrix public, which may leak information on the
identities contained in the database, or to perform PCA in the
encrypted domain, which will increase the overall complexity
TABLE III
BANDWIDTH (BITS) OF THE SSP PROTOCOL IN [10] WITH A DATABASE OF
100 ENROLLED ENTRIES (900 FEATURE VECTORS). SECURITY
PARAMETER: 80 BITS
Features Quantization B (bits)
96 2 1,610,000
96 4 1,912,400
192 2 1,691,670
192 4 1,994,070
640 8 4,394,200
of the protocol. Further research will be devoted to assessing
the actual pros and cons of the PCA strategy when applied in
a realistic scenario.
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